
Comments on the paper on gas pricing provided by the EU experts for the RF-EU experts meeting in Moscow on June 26-27, 2012

A.Konoplyanik,

11th round of informal Russia-EU experts Consultations on EU regulatory issues / 4th meeting of Work stream on internal markets, EU-Russia Gas Advisory Council, June 26-27, Moscow, Gazprom / Gazprom export

Gas Market development stages & pricing mechanisms

Figure 5: The Dynamics of Gas Markets Development




Source - based on Andrei Konophyanik

A.Konoplyanik, comments on gas pricing, Moscow 26-27.06.2012

Evolution of gas pricing mechanisms

- Cost plus (net forward):
 - Consumer takes the price if no alternative supplies (gas & other energies) => price to cover the cost => price risk at the consumer end
- (Net-back) replacement value based:
 - Competitive energy market (gas to compete with other energies) => to link gas price to price of replacement fuels
 - NBRV (gas) > cost-plus (gas) => gas to be producible
 - NBRV (gas) < cost-plus (gas alternatives) => gas to be competitive
 - Price risk shifting from the consumer end to the producer end
 - If NBRV price linked to commodities (replacement fuels) to increase frequency of its adaptations /price reviews => to be adaptable & flexible = to be competitive
- Spot/futures (exchange based /commodities):
 - Price risk has moved totally to the producer end of the gas value chain (from investor's angle) and is unpredictable (from trade's angle)
- General conclusion: evolution of (gas) pricing mechanisms has been shifting price risk to the producer BUT capital intensity (& unit capital value) of the upstream projects has been increasing due to worsening natural conditions of the fields (global general trend since edge 1960-ies/1970-ies) => disbalance between costs & price risks

Evolution of gas export pricing in Continental Europe & FSU/CIS



A.Konoplyanik, comments on gas pricing, Moscow 26-27.06.2012

Gas pricing: price indexation vs. spot/futures pricing – pros & contras (1)

Price indexation	Spot/futures pricing
Long-term stable non- interruptible gas supply with minimum costs & risks for both LTGEC parties => maximum marketable resource rent	Maximization of profit short- term => to earn on price fluctuations => maximum price fluctuations
Physical gas market => non- liquid, but more stable	Paper gas market => liquid, but less stable
Hedgers => mostly producers / traders of physical gas => limited & stable spectrum of participants	Speculators => mostly traders of gas contracts => inflow / outflow of financial players => open & unstable spectrum of participants


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Gas pricing: price indexation vs. spot/futures pricing – pros & contras (2)

Price indexation	Spot/futures pricing
Predictable contract prices => based on stable contractual formulas	Unpredictable spot prices & forward curves since based on frequently changing perceptions of global financial market players
Transparent formula & price review mechanisms <i>though</i> actual price not available to public immediately: (i) price calculated as function of formula ingredients, (ii) LTGEC confidentiality clauses	Transparent & immediate result (price quotations) <i>but</i> non-transparent & unclear decision-making mechanism on price levels (based on perceptions of big & unstable amount of players)

Gas pricing: price indexation vs. spot/futures pricing – pros & contras (3)

Price indexation	Spot/futures pricing
Impossible to manipulate – fixed formula & contractual clauses; adaptation on bilateral basis within legally-binding procedure	Possibility to manipulate: (i) by direct price-manipulations, (ii) by influencing on expectations (perceptions) of market players
To soften price-peaks (narrow corridor of price fluctuations) => to stabilize gas market	To amplify price-peaks (expand corridor of price fluctuations) => to destabilize gas market
Price indexation (LTC) aimed at delivery	Spot/futures aimed at trade



Results of J.Stern's FLAME polls on expected time of gas price decoupling from oil prices

Table 1: When do you expect European long tern contract gas prices will become decoupled from oil and determined by spot and futures prices? (% of total)

YEAR OF CONFERENCE PO	DLL:	2004	2005	2008	2009	2010
Before end 2010	7	24	15	8.7	3.8	4
Before end 2015	Å	36	15	22.1	20.3	20
Later than 2015	1	15	39	42.5	44.3	51
Never	1	24	31	28.8	31.6	25

Source: FLAME Conference for respective years

Source: J.Stern. "Continental European Long-Term Gas Contracts: is a transition away from oil product-linked pricing inevitable and imminent?", OIES, NG34, September 2009, p.5; Ibid. "Gas Price Formation in Europe: rationale and next steps", Presentation at GMT, 8 October 2010.

Future of LTGEC with indexation: industry view

Q9 Oil-indexed long-term gas contracts are increasingly exposed to unprecedented take-or-pay pressures in Europe. Where are we heading?

The divergence of oil and gas prices will be a short-term phenomenon and such indexing will survive, as will long-term contracts			15%				
Long-term contract volumes will be re-negotiated to reduce the take-or-pay pressures on their buyers			22	%			
Long-term contract indexes will be re-negotiated in line with traded market price levels but keeping an element of oil indexation					37%		
This is the end of the artificial divide between traded market hub pricing and oil indexation. Long-term contracts will move to hub pricing			18%				
Long-term contracts are no longer justified for most of the gas coming into Europe. We are witnessing their demise		8%					
	0	10	20	30 0/ 0	40	50	60
Source: Europe's gas industry need transformation to adap	ot to ener	gy revolut	ion. Key mes	sages from	the 24 th Euro	opean Autur	nn

Gas Conference, held in Bilbao in northern Spain in November 2009", December 2009, p.14.

How to adapt LTGEC with indexation: industry view

Q10 With an increasing number of long-term contracts under review pressure, how do you think this is most likely to be resolved, given the large amount of value embedded in them?

No-one wants to get blamed for giving away value; very hostile arbitration is going to become even more common			17 %					
The issues are too profound and complex to leave to <u>arbitrary panel outcomes; settlements</u> will be negotiated								65%
The system of review is tried and trusted and will carry on as usual			18%					
Source: Europe's gas industry need transformation to a	0 adapt t	10	20 v revolutio	30 n. Key me	40	50	60 ^h Europec	70

Source: Europe's gas industry need transformation to adapt to energy revolution. Key messages from the 24th European Autumn Gas Conference, held in Bilbao in northern Spain in November 2009", December 2009, p.15.

A.Konoplyanik, comments on gas pricing, Moscow 26-27.06.2012