Debate on some elements of further adaptation of Russia's/Gazprom's gas export policy (after cancellation of South Stream, decisions on Turkish Stream & Nordstream-2), EU reaction & possible way forward

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
- 1) Adaptation within new EU gas market architecture (new supply flexibility)
- 2) Diversity of pipelines routes ("multiple pipelines" concept)
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- 4) EU responds to new Russian challenges: the options
- 5) Specificity of Russia's "multiple pipelines" concept in Asia Pacific

Preconditions for new Russian gas supply model to Europe: commodities market 1) Changing contracting structures & pricing mechanisms – operation within new EU gas market architecture:

- a. From the **chain of three consecutive LTC** with supply and transportation contracts (first bundled, then unbundled, but to be mutually correlated) to the system of **"entry-exit" market zones** with VTP (hubs) within unbundled commodity and capacity markets
- Unbundled commodity market: mature & oversupplied (either contractually or physically) market, "gas-to-gas" competition, two market segments – contractual & spot – in competitive coexistence
- c. Unbundled capacity market: supplier as a shipper only; capacity allocation: (i) auctions by default, (ii) more than 2 IPs/cross-border pipelines, conditional booking of new capacity by shipper "open seasons" (Art.20(d))

New model for EU: Evolution of gas value chain & pricing mechanism of Russian gas to EU (1)

Past (Pre-2009) – growing EU market




New model for EU: Evolution of gas value chain & pricing mechanism of Russian gas to EU (2)


Future ("NO GO" contractual scheme under any (?) supply-demand scenario)



Gazprom as price-taker from GAS
BUYER's market (with no
participation on it)? => NO GO

Future (what competitive niche for oil-indexed LTC & spot deliveries & trade to/within EU?)






Source of primary chart):ERI RAS (T.Mitrova), reproduced in & taken from «The Russian Gas Matrix: How Markets Are Driving Change», Ed. by J.Henderson & S.Pirani, Oxford University Press, 2014, Fig.3.1/p.53.

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Preconditions for new Russian gas supply model to Europe: capacities market

- 2) Diversification of routes/means of supplies: from GOSPLAN's (single pipe/corridor to export market) to "multiple pipelines" concept (at least two pipes / corridors or means of supply to each export market):
 - a. Change of concept of risk assessment/minimization: from (cheaper) central planning & direct control on each export route through to delivery point – to (more costlier) competitive choice among few routes/means of supply (taking into consideration comparative costs & risks)
 - b. Economic justification of new pipelines/means of supply to mature markets: not new gas, but transit risk mitigation & liquidation of transit monopoly


Ukraine: "transit interruption probability" index (2009–2015)



(1) Very fact that Russia & Ukraine cannot solve issues between them bilaterally; at least one of them (UA) demands 3rd party (EU) as mediator/conciliator for searching temporary compromises + files a case against Russia in SCC, means its systematic mistrust to contractual partner; (2) UA is in state of civil war, but considers RF as invader => permanent transit risk for supplier since it is his responsibility to provide timely delivery of contracted volumes to **delivery points** deep inside the EU non-dependent his issues with third parties => sovereign right of resource owner (Russia) or its agent (Gazprom) to evaluate such risk & undertake adequate measures for its mitigation (incl. by-passes)
A.Konoplyanik, Lecture for GDF-Suez, 21.09.2015



Russian gas supply contracts to Central & South-Eastern EU with UA transit till 2035 = 100% security for TSO project financing of new capacity



Source: calculated by E.Orlova (FIEF) based on based on: "Turkish stream": Scenarios of by-passing Ukraine and barriers of European Commission". Vygon Consulting, June 2015 (fig.4, p.30).

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Russia-Ukraine transit contract to EU will expire in 2019. What then? Possible scenarios & motivations for exporter & importer

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Possible actions & motivations of exporter & importer post-2019



To keep transportation of Russian gas to EU through Ukraine (*EU: YES // RF: NO* (economic motivation – transit risks), when/if possible without violation of existing supply obligations)

To preserve status-quo: to keep transit of Russian gas through Ukraine and delivery points in acting supply contracts, but possible adaptation (EU: YES // RF: NO, transit risks)

To move delivery points in transportation contracts to Russia-Ukraine border, and to keep them unchanged in supply contracts (EU: YES, transit risks to be taken by EU // RF: NO, GP still responsible for delivery to EU, transit risk still exists)

To move to Russia-Ukraine border delivery points both in supply and transportation contracts (*EU: YES // RF: NO*, at least for existing contracts, since means rewriting of both supply & transportation contracts)

To abandon transportation of Russian gas to EU through Ukraine (RF:YES // EU: NO, motivations both political (EU support of new UA Gov't) & economic (to stay with Russia transit payments to UA instead of EU financial support to UA for economic stability)

At the initiative of EU institutions &/or buyers (YES, if transit risks are considered; NO, if policy is considered)



Refusal to buy equivalent volumes of Russian gas (*EU: NO, since leads to violation of existing supply obligations*)

Rerouting of equivalent volumes to other non-UA transportation routes (incl. to existing ones) => i.e. increase utilization of OPAL to full capacity, etc. (EU & RF: YES, but depends on utilization procedures)

At the initiative of Russia/Gazprom (supplier) (YES: economic motivation – transit risks)



Rerouting equivalent volumes to new transportation routes bypassing Ukraine => post 01.12.2014/18.06.2015: Turkish Stream & Nordstream-2 & their prolongation within EU => RF-EU Informal Consult./WS2 GAC =>



Art.36 Exempt.





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EU support for transit via Ukraine: the end or the means? (1)

- EU has multiply stated its support for continuation of RUS gas transit via UA post-2019 => (it seems that) this is why EU opposes redirection of RUS gas supplies to new transportation routes to EU post-2019
- But (it seems that) EU (CEC) support for existing & future transit of RUS gas via UA is not the end, but just the means; the real goal is:
 - to provide UA with steady financial flow of transit revenues from RUS supply contracts to EU via UA (with currently "unfriendly" to RF political regime in UA) – instead of donating corresponding EU financial aid to UA, and
 - financing/guaranteeing pay-back of UA-EU-USA GTS consortium (acc.to UA Law 4116a) in modernization of US GTS (RUS participation in consortium forbidden by UA law, but transit of RUS gas is the only way to make consortium financeable):
 - either under existing supply formula (RUS supplies directly to inside EU through UA) => RUS will continue taking transit risk via UA,
 - or by newly EUC proposed formula: delivery of RUS gas at RUS-UA border, in which case:
 - either EU companies will take the transit risk via UA by themselves (which they are not willing yet),
 - or there might be possible role for de facto EU Single Purchasing Agency mentioned in the Energy Union Package? ["options for voluntarily demand aggregation mechanisms for collective purchase of gas during a crisis and where Member States are dependent on a single supplier"]?

EU support for transit via Ukraine: the end or the means? (2)

- Whether EU will change its opposition to US bypasses if alternative means for UA to earn money are presented instead of gas transit revenues?
- An idea: "Russian gas circle" with expanded trade at the hub (Baumgarten) which requires regular use of UGS => role for UA UGS ? =>
- UGS in Western UA to be used not for seasonal adjustment of RUS transit flows to EU, but to adjust market fluctuations at the hub (Baumgarten),
 - this will also make Mr.Shevkovich happy since Slovak system will be fully utilized for direct &/or reverse flows both for supplies and UGS use
 - UA will be further integrated into EU energy system

Russian gas ring diminishes UA transit risk + a non-transit way for **UA to raise gas revenues (covers issue of major concern of EU)** Today: GP uses UA UGS for seasonal adjustments of RUS transit flows to EU Post-2019 (no UA transit?): GP to use UGS in Western UA to balance market fluctuations at EU market in the nearest market zones (hub Baumgarten, etc.) => GP shall be present at EU hubs **NB:** "Russian gas ring" supply concept as a RF & EU safeguard from new transit monopolies + new revenues for UA **Hub** in Baumgarten UGS in Western UA A.Konoplyanik, Lecture for GDF-Suez, 21.09.2015

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Project-oriented & regulatory options

- Project-oriented respond from business & EU authorities: fragmented approach (not full compliance with stated demand for new capacity ("spaghetti pipelines"):
 - DG ENERGY: Central East South Europe Connectivity (CESEC)
 - Eastring (Routes A &/or B), Tesla, TAP expansion, etc.
 - Vertical Gas Corridor
- Available regulatory EU options and new respond:
 - Exemptions route (Art. 36 Third Gas Directive)
 - TYNDP/PCI procedure
 - Draft CAM NC INC (draft Amended Regulation 984/2014 Art. 20(d):
 - From draft Art.20(h) RUS/GG experts proposal to ACER's draft Art. 20(d) => the latter de facto presents updated version of RUS/GG experts' proposal on "Coordinated Open Season Procedure"
 - Proposal at WS2 RF-EU GAC for "Early implementation" of Art.20(d) procedure => test study either for Turkish stream or/and Nordstream-2 extensions inside EU

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Russia & Europe in the past vs Russia & Europe & Asia in the future (new factual Russia's gas export model) Nadym-Pur-Tazovsky & Yamal **УРЕНГОЙ** Проектируемые Supplies to EU •••• «Сила Сибири» --**East-Siberian** и Иркутской области нижневареро Sakhalin Юрубчено-Тохомское Сахалин III onsore Центры газодобычи offshore Красноярский ТЮМЕНЬ Иркутский КОМСОМОЛЬСК-НА-АМУРЕ БОГУЧАНЫ Якутский KOPCAKOB Сахалинский ПОИМА S China: Esila Sibiring **ХАБАРОВСК КРАСНОЯРСК** ■ ГПЗ и ГХК новосибирск Месторождения проскоково В КИТАЙ ДАЛЬНЕРЕЧЕНСК БАЛАГАНСК БАРНАУЛ (**ИРКУТСК** Supplies to China S Danascrox-CIT БИЙС TORUS OF THE PROPERTY OF THE P но-алтайск KA3AXCTAE улан-батор монголия КИТАЙ Source of original map: http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/projects/pipelines/ykv/ Resource Pipeline supplies bases (options) LNG supplies (options)

Thank you for your attention!

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