"Third EU Energy Package: Regulatory changes for internal EU energy markets (gas) and possible consequences for suppliers and consumers"

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• Why attention to the internal EU energy law futures from non-EU producers?
• Future architecture of the EU internal gas market according to 3rd EU Energy package (2009)
• Some key problems of the 3rd EU Energy package – and possible solutions:
  – Contractual mismatch problem – to provide long-term access to transportations capacity
  – Conflict with project financing principles – derogations from MTPA
  – Gas pricing: overall spot/futures pricing – or slow adaptations of LTGEC pricing formulas
“Energy Europe” is much broader than just geographical EU

Legend:
- EU member-states
- CPs of Energy Community Treaty EU-SEE
- Non-EU states connected with EU by cross-border pipelines
- Non-EU states to be connected with EU by cross-border pipelines
Interconnected Interdependent Energy
Europe/Eurasia: shared challenges & risks (1)

• Within cross-border European/Eurasian energy value chains, National Energy Security = International Energy Security = security of supplies + security of infrastructure + security of demand within whole interconnected & interdependent common energy space

• Major threat to international energy security is threat of wrong investment decisions

• EU has been & would be major export energy market for Russia => challenges & risks at EU energy market can (de)stimulate EU-oriented energy trade & investment from non-EU => to better know & understand in advance EU developments in energy policies & law futures, new challenges and risks, and how to best face them (to diminish costs, improve competitiveness, incl. - in result - global EU competitiveness)
“Energy markets evolved in two different ways: (a) bottom-up - the market evolved to serve the natural need of the market participants (oil, oil products, coal), (b) designed markets (gas, power, emissions)… Design not always leads to the desired outcome.” (J. Novotny, LDH Energy, Oct. 2010) => Development of EU legislation reflect “designed markets”, it is driven not by business, but by administrative/political forces/efforts/modelling based on not sometimes well-justified & not-fully-proved-in-practice concepts & perceptions, like overestimation of competition role: “the more competition (number of players), the better (end-user price will go down)” (CEC DG COMP)

Within “designed markets” continuous (preferably not-formalized & cooperative) dialogue much more needed: between EU energy legislators and those from non-EU, with EU & non-EU business & expert community (state-to-state & state-to-business regular consultations), etc. => to diminish cross-border risks & costs, to balance trade & investment stimuli, physical & paper energy markets
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Third EU Energy Package (gas)

**Gas Directive**
73/EC/09

**Regulations**
713/2009 (ACER) & 715/2009 (access to pipelines)

**Framework Guidelines**

**Network Codes**

Legally binding;
Entered into force
03.09.2009;
EU Member States to comply by 03.03.2011 / 03.03.2012

To become legally binding after preparation & approval
This will request further 2-3-4 years? =>
To be effective in practical use – regular, continuous & well structured cooperation needed with major suppliers & transitters

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Future organization of the common internal EU gas market according to 3rd EU Energy Package

- No single (homogenous) internal EU gas market in the near future even as an economic model
- All market areas to be organized as entry–exit zones with virtual hubs => Towards uniform capacity allocation mechanisms (“bundled products”) & gas pricing mechanisms (“liquid hubs”), but:
  
  (1) Capacity allocation: short-term vs. long-term? At zone borders? At hubs? Bundled products – only on volumes (of throughput capacity) or on duration of access as well? How to overcome inconveniences of the 3rd Package? (f.i.: long-term = (1 year+) => “contractual mismatch” problem)
  (2) Gas pricing at hubs: on all gas volumes or just on a portion of gas supplies? When hubs would become really liquid? All or only few of them? Which ones?

Source: 17th Madrid Forum (Jan 2010), Energy Regulators EU MS
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Key provisions of the EU Gas Directives (1998/2003/2009) and the problems they created

Key CEC/DG COMP assumption/philosophy: “The more competition (number of players / intermediaries) – the better it is for end-users” (???) => the policies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key provisions 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} EU Gas Directives</th>
<th>Problems they creates (incremental risks for trade &amp; investment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Segmentation of VIOC (unbundling)</td>
<td>“Contractual mismatch” (long-term supply vs transportation contract: correlation in duration &amp; volumes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory third party access (MTPA) to gas transportation infrastructure,</td>
<td>Bankability of investment projects (MTPA discriminates project financing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switch from LTGEC to spot trade</td>
<td>Increased price volatility &amp; diminished price predictability (price loosing its guidance for long-term &amp; capital-intensive investment decisions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Instruments for implementing key provisions of EU Gas Directives outside the EU

Export of EU «acquis communautiare» through:


• *Third EU Gas Directive (2009)* => “Third party clauses” of Directive 73/EC/09 + sanctions for violation of Directive’s provisions (up to 10% of global turnover of mother company) => legal collision (?): how EU law (acquis communautaire) corresponds with international law provisions (ECT, etc.)
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“Long-term” (gas export contracts): different durations in historical European practice & its definition in 3rd EU Energy Package

- Minimum duration from economic point of view (pay-back period of upstream investment project)
- General starting point of LTC (Talus)
- Average duration of LTGEC to EU, signed, pipeline & LNG (Hirschhausen-Newmann)
- Normal duration of LTC (Talus/Schafer)

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Contractual mismatch: between duration/volumes (D/V) of long term supply/delivery contract (LTGEC; CP1-CP2) and transit/transportation contract (CP1-CP3); the latter is integral part to fulfill the delivery contract => risk non-renewal transit/transportation contract => risk non-fulfillment supply/delivery contract.

Core issue: guarantee of access to/creation of adequate transportation capacity for volume/duration of long term contracts.
Long-term vs short-term capacity allocation: problem & draft solutions

- **Problem**: in 3rd package “long-term” = 1 year+ (Regulation (EC) 715/2009) => this will de-stipulate long-term investment supply projects which are to be supported by long-term contracts (duration to be long enough to guarantee pay-back of long-term upstream investments)

- **Two draft solutions**:
  - “Right of First Refusal” (if available only short-term capacity products) => appropriate for suppliers, but as if incompatible with EU acquis - due to RF-EU bilateral informal consultations on Energy Charter Protocol on Transit in 2004-2007,
  - To provide long-term capacity allocation products => “bundled capacity products” to refer NOT only to **volumes**, but to **durations** as well => two-dimensional model of “bundled capacity product” (volume & duration) to escape *contractual mismatch* problem => draft procedure jointly developed by RF & EU experts during RF-EU informal bilateral consultations on Energy Charter Protocol on Transit in 2004-2007

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Debate on Third Party Access (TPA)

No

TPA

Yes

Project Financing

Negotiatory TPA

Mandatory TPA

Derogation from MTPA

ECT (1994/98)


Art. 21-22

Art. 35-36

9 projects in EU: 7 LNG terminals + 2 pipelines-interconnectors

NABUCCO: Time-period to receive derogation from MTPA = 28 months (during this period Turkmenistan-China pipeline was built) => collision “competition vs investments” in the EU Law leads to declining competitiveness, incl. both EU projects & companies

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### Liquidity of European gas hubs (churn ratio)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gas Hub</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>National Balancing Point (NBP)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Zeebrugge (ZEE)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Central European Gas Hub (CEGH)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Title Transfer Facility (TTF)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Punto di Scambio Virtuale (PSV)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NetConnect Germany (NCG, EGT prior 2009)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>GASPOOL (BEB)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Point d’Echange de Gaz (PEG)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For comparison:
- USA (oil): NYMEX (WTI) (Feb.2010) 1680-2240
- UK (oil): ICE (Brent) (Feb.2010) 2014
- USA (gas): NYMEX Henry Hub (av.2009) 377

**Break-even churn level for liquid marketplace** 15

**Churn** is the commonly used parameter for measuring liquidity level of marketplaces; defined as the ratio of traded volumes to physical gas deliveries from the marketplace after trades.

Source: “Gas Matters”, IHS-CERA, IEA, M.Kanai (ECS)
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Price indexation structure in the EU

Oil derivates dominate the price indexation

European Union

- General inflation
- Light fuel oil and gasoil
- Coal price
- Crude oil
- Gas price
- Other
- Heavy fuel oil
- Electricity price
- Fixed


Heavy fuel oil + Gasoil & Diesel = 75%

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LTGEC in the EU: Indexation by Producer

Netherlands, Norway, Russia:
- HFO = 35-39%;
- Diesel & Gasoil = 52-55%;
- Sum-total HFO + Diesel & Gasoil: Netherlands = 92%, Norway = 87%, Russia = 92%

Major gas exporters to the EU: mostly oil indexation

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LTGEC in Europe: Indexation by Region - Historical Evolution from Less to More Liberalized Markets

UK price indexation is very different to that in continental Europe

- UK: 30%
- Western Europe: 80%
- Eastern Europe: 95%

Russia-Ukraine LTGEC (2009-2019)
- Oil indexation = 100%
- 50.0%

Basic Groningen LTGEC model (since 1962)
- 60.0%

Evolution of LTGEC pricing formula structure: from more simple to more complicated

NB: Russia-Ukraine 2009 LTGEC structure rationale: more practical (understandable & sustainable) to start with less sophisticated pricing formula => similar to basic Groningen formula
Further development (most likely): towards EE-type => WE-type => UK-type price indexation => away from oil parity?

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Evolution/adaptation of gas pricing mechanisms in Europe: major options (1)

1. Preferable & most probable scenario of LTGEC pricing formulas adaptation in Continental Europe
2. Third EU Energy package (Anglo-Saxon model)
3. Option 1
4. Option 2
5. Option 3
6. Option 4
7. Option 5

Possible radical change of energy-pricing in the long-term by adding ecological component into price based on “polluter pays” principle

Oil indexation level of LTGEC gas prices (% of oil parity)

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Evolution/adaptation of gas pricing & contractual mechanisms in Europe: major options (2)

- **Option 1:** to substitute gas price indexation in LTGECs by spot/futures quotations => **NO**
- **Option 2:** to maintain status-quo (LTGEC with dominant oil indexation) => **NO**
- **Option 3:** to maintain oil-indexation within LTGEC and to move to oil parity => **NO**
- **Option 4:** to adapt mostly oil-linked gas price indexation in LTGEC by pricing formulas linked to broader spectrum of parameters & non-oil gas replacement values => **YES** (long-term capacity allocation *must* be available to exclude contractual mismatch problems - supply vs. transportation):
  - **Long-term supplies (basic/base-load):** more flexible LTGEC (+ access to pipeline adequate to LTGEC volume / duration: n x 1 year) + “modified” gas replacement value formulas (price indexation *not* limited to oil-pegging);
  - **Short-term supplies (supplementary/peak- & semi-peak load):** short-term (< 1 year)/spot contracts + futures quotations
- **Option 5:** to develop new pricing concepts leading to exceeding oil parity by gas prices (LTGEC + new indexation ingredients, like comparative ecological (dis)advantages of different fuels, etc.) => **NOT NOW**

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Thank you for your attention

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